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Abstract. The cultivation of receptivity to the mystery of reality is a  central 
feature of many religious and philosophical traditions, both Western and Asian. 
This paper considers two contemporary accounts of receptivity to mystery – 
those of David e. Cooper and John Cottingham – and considers them in light of 
the problem of loss of receptivity. I argue that a person may lose their receptivity 
to mystery by embracing what I call a scientistic stance, and the paper concludes 
by offering two possible responses to combating that stance and restoring the 
receptivity to mystery that it occludes.
let us follow it up ... wherever it is to be found, in the lives of those 
around us ... If we do so we shall find we are dealing with something for 
which there is only one appropriate expression, mysterium tremendum. 
The feeling of it may at times come sweeping like a gentle tide, pervading 
the mind with a  tranquil mood of deepest worship. It may pass over 
into a more set and lasting attitude of the soul, continuing, as it were, 
thrillingly vibrant and resonant, until at last it dies away and the soul 
resumes its ‘profane’, non-religious mood of everyday experience. 
(rudolf otto) 1
understanding the idea of receptivity to mystery depends crucially 
on the notion or account of mystery in play. This paper focuses upon 
the sense of that term associated with various religious and spiritual 
traditions, including the practices, discourses and communities whose 
1 rudolf otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry Into the Non-rational Factor In the Idea 
of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. J.W. Harvey (london: H. milford/
oxford university Press, 1923), pp. 12-13.
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purpose it is to articulate and perhaps induce experiences of mystery. 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, for instance, wrote that an aim of religious 
practice is to align the ‘environment to which [one] belong[s]’ with the 
‘universal source of spiritual life’. Through such practical transformation, 
one’s life becomes one of ‘communion’ with that source.2 rudolf otto 
also described an awareness of ‘the presence of that which is a mystery 
inexpressible’, something present in both ‘sudden, strong ebullitions of 
personal piety’ and the ‘fixed and ordered solemnities of rites’, but which, 
if appropriately cultivated and responded to, is open to being ‘developed 
into something beautiful and pure and glorious’.3
These two testimonies help to indicate what I will call receptivity to 
mystery, and may either remind those who share such receptivity of it, or 
inspire those who do not – for, as later sections of the paper will indicate, 
such receptivity is not a universal feature of human beings’ comportment 
within the world.
Since both experiences of mystery and their associated practices are 
too diverse to treat in any comprehensive sense, I  focus here on their 
treatment by two contemporary philosophers, David e. Cooper and 
John Cottingham. both affirm the central importance of ‘experiences of 
mystery’ and ‘intimations of the transcendent’, respectively, in religious 
life, even though they disagree on the nature of those experiences 
and intimations. but both agree on two points which are germane to 
my interests here. The first is that those experiences – of mystery or of 
transcendence – can sponsor forms of religious life; hence Cooper argues 
that ‘living with mystery [is] a form of religious life’, while Cottingham 
defends the claim that religiosity involves living in responsive awareness 
of the ‘mystery of existence’.4
The second is that that both mystery and transcendence, different as 
they may be, are both vulnerable to a  specific concern, one identified 
by both Cooper and Cottingham, which I will call loss of receptivity to 
mystery. That term offers three related tasks, each to be taken in turn. 
The first is to explain what Cooper and Cottingham mean by ‘mystery’ 
or ‘transcendence’, or which, for brevity’s sake, I will refer to as a ‘sense of 
2 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, H.r. mackintosh and J.S. Stewart 
(eds.) (edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), §§93.3 and 6.2.
3 rudolf otto, The Idea of the Holy, pp. 12-13.
4 David e. Cooper, ‘living with mystery’, p 13, and John Cottingham, ‘religion and 
the mystery of existence’,  p. 31, both in the present volume.
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mystery’. It is that sense to which certain persons can become receptive. 
The second is to characterise such receptivity to mystery, as described by 
Cooper and Cottingham, including the practices through which it can 
be cultivated. The third then considers what the loss of such receptivity 
entails and, importantly, what might cause a person to lose it – and my 
focus will, following Cooper and Cottingham, be upon a prime suspect, 
which I’ll call a ‘scientistic stance’.
I. mYSTerY AND TrANSCeNDeNCe
It is worth beginning by noting some criticisms of these themes of mystery 
and transcendence. Those two terms are distinct from one another, as 
this section will indicate, but both arouse the suspicion or concern of 
many philosophers, a fact noted by both Cooper and Cottingham. The 
very idea of mystery is dismissed by two luminaries of contemporary 
philosophy – those being richard rorty and Hilary Putnam – on the 
grounds that it ‘do[es] not get us anywhere’ and that such a doctrine gives 
us no obvious reason to ‘aim at’ it.5 Indeed, it is not just mystery itself, but 
religion more widely, which has, perhaps, suffered from philosophical 
neglect. The philosophy of religion itself has suffered a contraction over 
the last few decades, such that we face, warns Cottingham, the ‘genuine 
possibility’ that religious thought and practice may vanish from the 
philosophical mainstream, ‘brusquely dismissed or politely ignored’ by 
those with avowed naturalistic commitments.6
The reasons for such sentiments are complex and since I discuss one 
of them – the ‘scientistic stance’ – later in the paper, they can be set aside 
for now. It is, however, worth my noting my agreement with Cooper’s 
judgement that it would be ‘hubris’ to ‘dismiss an idea’ – that of receptivity 
to and living with a sense of mystery – that has featured centrally within 
‘spiritual traditions’, ranging from Neo-platonism in europe to Daoism in 
China. There is surely truth, too, in Cottingham’s allied observation that 
such ‘traditions of spirituality’ have, since antiquity, ‘served ... countless 
human beings’ in their efforts to conceive and comport their lives.7
5 Quoted and discussed in David e. Cooper, The Measure of Things: Humanism, 
Humility and Mystery (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 281-282. This book is 
Cooper’s most systematic account of his doctrine of mystery.
6 John Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Value and Human Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2005), p. viii.
7 Cooper, ‘living with mystery’, p. 8 and Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, p. 140.
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Perhaps few contemporary philosophers share or easily sympathise 
with the convictions and sensibilities reflected in those traditions, but 
that is poor reason to dismiss them. Indeed, once one appreciates that 
those same concerns continue to animate many persons today, the very 
idea of dismissing them surely becomes hubristic. It requires little exercise 
of historical or sociological prowess to recognise that experiences of 
mystery, including the sensibilities and concerns which gather around 
them, are deep and abiding features of the human condition.
let me begin with Cooper, who in several recent writings has developed 
and defended a ‘doctrine of mystery’. The central claim is that reality as 
it is, independently of human perspectives, is ‘ineffable and mysterious’, 
such that ‘no account of the world ... could count as a  description of 
reality as such’, for any such description would be tied to the purposes, 
practices and perspectives of the creatures, whether human or not, which 
provided them. The doctrine of mystery which Cooper develops owes 
much to buddhism, Daoism and the later Heidegger, amongst many 
others, indicating that it is not an ‘abstract’ doctrine – held on paper but 
never realised in practice – but is, rather, one which has ‘played a central 
role in [the] moral and religious practice’ of many cultures. Indeed, 
a sense of mystery has been one which ‘reflective men and women’, from 
Zhuangzi to Wittgenstein, have been ‘apt to cultivate’, owing to their 
recognition that the ‘comportments’ in which an experience of mystery 
is ‘built-in’ provide attractive ‘ways of dealing [with and] dwelling’ in the 
world.8 Such testimonies do not, of course, establish or prove a doctrine 
of mystery, but they should offset the initial scepticism of those critics 
who might doubt their very intelligibility.
The doctrine of mystery that Cooper offers is more sophisticated 
than this brief sketch can indicate, but enough has been said, for now, to 
indicate that a central feature of it is that it incorporates the possibility 
of one’s having a ‘sense of mystery’ which shapes and informs one’s life. 
A cultivated sense of the mysteriousness of reality effects a transformation 
of a person’s attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour, both by liberating them 
from unwarrantedly hubristic doctrines and by inducing a sense of acute 
dependence upon what is beyond human understanding and control – 
a claim which Cooper makes good on in other recent writings.9
8 Cooper, The Measure of Things, pp. 281, 364, 358.
9 As well as his ‘living with mystery’ in this volume, see also his ‘mystery, World 
and religion’, in Philosophers and God: At the Frontiers of Faith and Reason, ed. John 
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Cottingham offers a  related, though distinct set of claims, writing 
eloquently of ‘aspirations and sensibilities’, which he refers to as 
‘intimations of the transcendent’. Such intimations refer to ‘something 
mysterious that transcends the boundaries of human comprehension’, 
which Cottingham interprets theistically using the resources of Christian 
theology and the philosophies and poetries it has inspired. So when 
Wordsworth reported a ‘presence that disturbs’ him, inspiring ‘elevated 
thoughts [and] a  sense sublime’, he testified to an intimation of the 
transcendent, in which the ‘setting suns [and] blue sky’ became ‘deeply 
interfused’ with the ‘mind of man’.10 Cottingham goes on to argue that 
the ‘incorporation’ of those intimations into a ‘sustaining form of life’ can 
‘enrich and transform’ one’s life.11
These intimations of the transcendent are not the peculiar property 
of certain privileged persons. For sure, those immersed in ‘communities 
of praxis’ which cultivate the requisite sensibilities may be more likely to 
enjoy them, but Cottingham stresses that they are part of the ‘birthright’ 
of all human beings.12 All of us, he suggests, feel expressions of ‘yearnings 
deep within our nature’ which ‘cannot be entirely eradicated’, or rendered 
mute. Indeed, they are the ‘primal human existential response’, the ‘well-
spring of spirituality’, and the ‘basis of the religious impulse’.13
It is important not to elide mystery and transcendence. Although 
there are parallels between Cooper and Cottingham’s respective 
accounts – such as a  sense of dependence on what is ‘beyond the 
human’ and corresponding hostility to ‘hubristic’ doctrines opposed 
to the cultivation of that sense – important differences remain between 
them. most obviously, Cottingham is a  theist and maintains that the 
transcendent is at least in principle open to human articulation, whereas 
Cornwall and michael mcGhee (london: Continuum, 2009), pp. 51-62; and Convergence 
with Nature: A  Daoist Perspective (Dartington: Green books, 2012). each of these 
works indicates how a sense of mystery can be cultivated and thereby inform a person’s 
comportment within the world.
10 William Wordsworth, Lines Written a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey [1798], in S. 
Gill (ed.), William Wordsworth: A Critical Edition of the Major Works (oxford: oxford 
university Press, 1984), ii., pp. 89-100. Quoted and discussed in John Cottingham, ‘our 
Natural Guide: Conscience, “Nature” and moral experience’, in David S. oderberg and 
Timothy Chappell (eds.), Human Values (london: Palgrave, 2004), pp. 11-31.
11 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, p. 171.
12 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, p. 35.
13 Cottingham, ‘religion and the mystery of existence’, p. 19.
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Cooper insists that mystery is just that – mysterious and so unavailable 
even in principle to articulation and description.
Those concerned with the differences between Cooper’s and 
Cottingham’s accounts are invited to consult their own respective 
writings, but the concern I  address in the remainder of this paper is 
one which applies both to mystery and to transcendence, however they 
are construed. For the scientistic stance that I  will criticise applies to 
both those who deny mystery in Cooper’s sense and those who deny 
a (perhaps effable) transcendence in Cottingham’s sense; however, since 
‘mystery’ carries fewer philosophical and theological connotations than 
transcendence, I will use that in the remainder of the paper.
II. reCePTIVITY To mYSTerY
let me indicate three common features of Cooper’s and Cottingham’s 
accounts which are relevant to my discussion of loss of receptivity to 
mystery. The first is that ‘mystery’ refers to or involves something 
‘beyond the human’, whether an undiscursible mystery or a transcendent 
reality.  The second is that receptivity to mystery is strongly related to 
moral and spiritual transformation – ones which, as Cooper puts it, ‘clear 
the mind’ of a person from ‘prejudices [and] ambitions’ which ‘deny ... 
space to the virtues’ – thereby releasing those persons into ways of life 
which enjoy a  ‘natural consonance’ with the world.14 Cottingham also 
identifies a sense of mystery, or transcendence, with liberation from false 
views, such as that the world is ‘violent and depressing’, ‘coloured solely 
by our own human projections’, or perhaps simply ‘devoid of anything 
other than temporary and local significance’.15
The third feature held in common by Cooper and Cottingham is the 
idea that receptivity to a sense of mystery can be cultivated by engaging 
in and with certain practices, communities and traditions. many 
candidates are available, and in their works, Cooper and Cottingham 
survey some of the more representative examples, ranging from the 
apophatic tradition of Christian mysticism to Zen buddhism. Alongside 
these overtly religious traditions, one should also include figures and 
traditions for whom the description ‘religious’ is more contestable. It 
strikes me that one can legitimately interpret Wittgenstein’s remarks 
14 Cooper, ‘living with mystery’, p. 10.
15 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, p. 87.
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upon the ‘miraculous’ nature of the world as religious, related as it was, 
for him, with the ‘meaning of life [and] the absolute good’, reflective of 
a ‘tendency of the human mind’ which he reported himself as ‘respecting 
deeply’.16 likewise, the practices through which receptivity to mystery 
is cultivated need not be overtly religious ones – taking liturgical or 
sacramental forms, say – but can include, as they do for Cooper, practices 
such as aesthetic appreciation, philosophical reflection, or engagement 
with the natural world. Indeed, Cooper has argued that gardening, 
uniquely premised as it is upon the co-dependence of ‘human creative 
activity [and] the natural world’, can, if reflectively engaged in, afford 
insights into one’s ‘relationship to mystery’.17
These three features converge in the claim that human beings can enjoy 
and cultivate receptivity to mystery through reflective engagement in 
certain practices. mystery, then, should be understood less as a taken-for-
granted feature of human life, but rather a cultivated feature of certain ways 
of life. Perhaps certain persons can enjoy a sense of mystery even in the 
absence of any of the requisite ways of life – just as even the most philistine 
ecophobe may occasionally be moved by an instance of natural beauty – 
but that sense of mystery will be unlikely to be able to sustain the ‘moral 
and spiritual transformation’ which Cooper and Cottingham emphasise.
The edifying potential of a  sense of mystery is premised upon the 
deep and sustained cultivation of one’s receptivity to it. That will 
require, in Cottingham’s words, ‘initiation’ into a ‘community of praxis’, 
participation in ‘structured activities and performances’, both private 
and social, which themselves enjoy ‘continuity with a  tradition’, itself 
‘inherited from the past’ and entrusted to the future.18 Cooper offers 
a parallel thought in a discussion of experiences of new or novel beauties, 
those of alien cultures, say: the appreciation of those beauties requires 
‘initiation into traditions, practices and ... contexts’ which ‘allow’ those 
previously ‘occluded’ beauties to ‘become visible’, and such initiation 
demands ‘effort, imagination, and intelligence’, and so is ‘educative’ and 
‘improving’.19 A  sense of mystery may therefore be a  native feature of 
16 ludwig Wittgenstein. ‘A  lecture on ethics’, The Philosophical Review, 74 (1965), 
3-12. Quotation from p. 12.
17 Cooper, A Philosophy of Gardens (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 135 and 145.
18 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, pp. 35, 103, 164, 144.
19 Cooper, ‘edification and the experience of beauty’, in Wang Keping (ed.), Diversity 
and Universality in Aesthetics (beijing: Institute for Transcultural Studies, 2010), pp. 62-80. 
Quotation taken from pp. 63-64.
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human beings – our ‘natural birthright’ – but the cultivation of that sense 
will, in most cases, require sustained and reflective practical engagement, 
resulting in an edifying ‘moral and spiritual transformation’.
I  draw two points from these remarks on the cultivation of 
receptivity to mystery. The first is that such receptivity must be actively 
and practically cultivated. Although it may be a feature of our ‘natural 
birthright’, it still requires sustained effort to cultivate it, just as a talent 
– musical or athletic, say – requires disciplined practice to draw out 
and develop. The second is that receptivity must be sustained, both 
practically and reflectively; hence Cottingham’s call to religious persons 
to cultivate the virtues of ‘faith and hope’ which ‘sustain our energies 
and keep alive our hopes’, and Cooper’s reminder that it is only through 
‘sufficient effort, engagement, openness and patience’ that a person can 
‘achieve an attunement to mystery’.20
III. loSS oF reCePTIVITY To mYSTerY
Cooper and Cottingham indicate that receptivity to mystery requires 
reflective and practical activities aimed at moral and spiritual 
transformation. The relevant ‘spiritual praxis’ or ‘comportments’ can, 
however, fail to obtain for one of two related reasons. A  person can 
fail to initiate or to persist in the practices which are necessary for its 
cultivation – perhaps like the person who either lacks a musical talent 
in the first place or who has it but fails to develop it, perhaps through 
laziness or indifference. A  latent sense of mystery may be part of our 
‘natural birthright’, but, without edifying practical and reflective effort, 
will remain at the level of a latent sensibility.
The question of why a person may fail to cultivate their receptivity to 
a sense of mystery is a complex one, whose immense scope is indicated 
by Charles Taylor’s vast and magisterial book A  Secular Age.21 but 
a necessary precondition of the cultivation of receptivity to mystery – of 
the sort described by Cooper and Cottingham – is surely that a person 
is convinced, or at least willing to consider, that such receptivity is both 
intelligible and attractive. unless a person is open to the possibility of 
experiences of mystery, in the first place, and to cultivating the requisite 
20 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, pp. 125, 172. Cooper, ‘living with mystery’, 
p. 11.
21 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, mass.: Harvard university Press, 2007).
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receptivity to them, in the second, they will not – and indeed cannot  – 
take the decision to begin initiation into the practices through which 
such receptivity is cultivated. The demanding nature of such cultivation 
is stressed by all of those religious and philosophical traditions within 
which a sense of mystery plays an integral role; the complex pedagogical 
and philosophical practices of Zen buddhism are perhaps the best 
example of such demanding practices of cultivation.
Cooper and Cottingham clearly regard a  sense of mystery as 
something of immense moral and spiritual significance. A person who 
lacks receptivity to mystery is, for that reason, prevented from having 
experiences of immense moral and spiritual significance, rather than just 
missing out on certain rare but pleasant experiences, like the eating of 
a rare confectionary or hearing a rarely-performed piece of music. The 
life of a person who never has the good fortune to eat plum pudding 
is not substantially impoverished by virtue of that fact, whereas a  life 
lacking in at least occasional experiences of mystery certainly is. but 
a  person who judges that experiences of mystery – of Wordsworth’s 
‘sense sublime’, say – are merely something pleasing but inessential, will 
hardly be compelled to take seriously the demanding task of cultivating 
a receptivity to them. For such persons will regard a sense of mystery as 
some regard seeing Niagara Falls or swimming with dolphins; very nice 
if you manage it, but no great loss to your life if you don’t.
Such lack of receptivity to mystery may be a  native feature of the 
persons who lack it. much as some people have no especial interest in 
music or sex, an indifference to experiences of mystery may simply be 
a feature of their character, peculiar as it may seem to any music lovers or 
romantic couples they report their indifference to. A life without music is 
not, pace Nietzsche, a mistake; not, at the least, for everyone, for there are 
persons who evince no especial love of music – or of art or sex or animals 
– but whose lives are, at least by their own lights, satisfying and fulfilling 
ones. To my mind, the life of a person who is not receptive to experiences 
of mystery is not, therefore, by definition a peculiar or impoverished one, 
at least in cases where that lack of receptivity is a native feature of their 
character or constitution. Perhaps those are William James’s ‘healthy-
minded’ people, who lack any sense of the world as ‘strange [or] uncanny’, 
such that no sense of mystery – nor the need for one – can obtain.22
22 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: longman, Green 
and Co., 1902), p. 151.
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I will not consider the question of whether a person ought to cultivate 
a sense of mystery. Perhaps such persons should not arouse our concern, 
even if their lives may prove inscrutable or perplexing to those for whom 
a sense of mystery is integral. but, equally, perhaps not.23
Concern should arise, however, concerning persons whose lack of 
receptivity to mystery may be attributable to more contingent factors. 
To recall the earlier example of the person with no love of music, their 
indifference may be native, if it really is the case that mozart and bach 
simply do not engage their interests or arouse their passions. but suppose 
that their indifference to music is, rather, the result of their growing up 
within a rabidly philistine household, within which a love of music was 
dismissed as snobbish indulgence or intolerable ponciness. This would 
not be a case of a natural lack of receptivity, but an artificial or induced 
one and therefore not one which would otherwise have come to shape 
that person’s life. Such was the case with John Stuart mill who famously 
found the ‘states of feeling’ suppressed by his rigid education restored by 
his reading of Wordsworth’s poetry, such that he could ‘find meaning in ... 
things’ – like nature and art – previously rendered opaque, and whose 
absence, moreover, resulted in his nervous breakdown.24
IV. THe SCIeNTISTIC STANCe
The artificial induction of a lack of receptivity to experiences of mystery 
could take a  variety of forms. A  person may have the bad fortune to 
live in an intensely oppressive society, in which opportunities for 
engagement with art, nature, or religious practice are either minimised 
or co-opted for ideological purposes. The French Catholic philosopher 
and existentialist Gabriel marcel took this line. A ‘man cannot be free’, he 
wrote, unless he is ‘linked with that which transcends him’, either through 
‘official and canonical’ religion or in ‘paint, or stone, or music’. A society 
systematically stripped of the possibilities for aesthetic or religious 
activities of these sorts is therefore one in which our ‘relationship to 
the transcendent’ cannot be ‘experience[d] in the most authentic and 
profound way’.25 Perhaps the receptivity to mystery of those persons has 
23 See further Ian James Kidd, ‘Is Naturalism bleak?’, Environmental Values, forthcoming.
24 John Stuart mill, Autobiography and Literary Essays, Jack Stillinger (ed.) (london: 
Taylor and Francis, 1981), p. 150.
25 Gabriel marcel, Man Against Mass Society, trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago: Henry 
regnery Company, 1962), p. 16.
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been atrophied through neglect and underuse, or simply been crushed 
by forms of physical and psychological oppression.
Such cases of spiritually oppressive societies are depressingly easy to 
provide, but the loss of receptivity is hardly confined to them. modern 
liberal societies afford enormous freedoms of religious belief and 
observance, yet many of their members evince no especial receptivity 
to mystery. A defining feature of those societies is, as Charles Taylor has 
observed, that religious belief is ‘no longer axiomatic’, that faith, in whatever 
religion, is ‘one human possibility among others’, alongside a spectrum of 
agnostic and atheistic alternatives.26 Although many factors contributed 
to what Taylor calls a change in the ‘conditions of belief [and] experience’, 
prime amongst them is the emergence of the modern sciences, which have 
gradually privileged a ‘disengaged standpoint’ upon the world.27
Taylor’s arguments for that claim are too complex to be summarised 
here, but they find resonance with parallel claims made by Cooper and 
Cottingham. Throughout their work, each criticises what I will call the 
scientistic stance, a powerful and prevailing feature of much contemporary 
academic and popular culture which, they argue, is eroding our receptivity 
to mystery. The term ‘stance’ is here used in the technical sense articulated 
by bas van Fraassen, to refer to an ‘attitude, commitment, approach [or] 
cluster of such’, possibly but not necessarily including certain beliefs, 
which constitutes a certain implicit conception of what the world is like, 
one which helps to pre-structure our experience of and engagement with 
it.28 A  scientistic stance reflects a  sense of the ‘exclusive sufficiency’ of 
natural scientific descriptions of reality, and is to be contrasted with what 
van Fraassen calls a stance of ‘abiding wonder’ at the world; a sense that 
the world is not exhausted by scientific description.29
The justification for nominating the scientistic stance is that, although 
many attitudes can contribute to a loss of receptivity to mystery, not all 
of those attitudes are either current within modern societies, or regarded 
as plausible and persuasive within it. A scientistic stance, of course, is, 
being both aligned with central features of ‘late modern’ societies – such 
as an enthusiasm for technology – and also incorporated into its sensus 
communis or worldview.
26 Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 4 passim.
27 Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. 4 and 11.
28 bas van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale university Press, 2002), pp. 47-48.
29 Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, pp. 47-155f.
62 IAN JAmeS KIDD
Cooper and Cottingham both identify the scientistic stance as a prime 
cause of the loss of receptivity to mystery in contemporary societies. 
A  person in hock to the scientistic stance employs what Cottingham 
calls a  ‘schematic picture of truth and reality’ which, though difficult 
to precisely characterise, ‘exerts an increasingly powerful influence, in 
a host of rational and pre-rational ways, on how many people feel able to 
interpret the world around them’.30 Those influences can be detrimental, 
for, as Cooper argues, such scientism surely counts among the many 
‘attitudes, ambitions and stances’ which are, for varying reasons, ‘not 
consonant with a sense of mystery’.31 So although the scientistic stance is 
not unique in its capacity to contribute to a loss of receptivity to mystery, 
it surely bears responsibility for much of the loss within modern societies.
A main reason why the scientistic stance undermines one’s receptivity 
to mystery was identified by Wittgenstein, a  figure invoked by both 
Cooper and Cottingham. The ‘disastrous thing about the scientific way of 
thinking’, complained Wittgenstein, is not simply that it ‘today possesses 
the whole world’, but also that it encourages those who embrace it to 
‘respond to every disquietude with an explanation’.32 The scientistic 
stance denies the possibility of mystery in the strong sense defended 
by Cooper by reducing it to ‘merely that [which] has not yet been 
explained by science’, thereby excluding the possibility of an ineffable, 
undiscursible reality.33 A certain sense of mystery is permitted, but that 
concession is compromised by the qualifying conviction that any such 
sense is destined to be dissolved by ongoing scientific enquiry, perhaps 
in a future ‘Theory of everything’. A sense of mystery of the strong sort 
described by Cooper and Cottingham is therefore ruled out and reduced 
to a transitory feature of our life in the world, rather than an irreducible 
and enduring aspect of it.34
30 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, p. 108.
31 Cooper, ‘living with mystery’, p. 6.
32 Quoted in James Carl Klagge, Wittgenstein in Exile (boston, mass.: mIT Press, 
2010), p. 129.
33 Wittgenstein, ‘A lecture on ethics’, The Philosophical Review, 74 (1965), 10-11.
34 might one interpret the rhetoric of awe and wonder popular amongst many science 
writers – like Carl Sagan and richard Dawkins – as reflections of a sense of mystery in 
this sense? I argue not, for two reasons. The first is that those writers allow the possibility, 
in principle or in practice, of descriptions of reality ‘in itself ’ – perhaps the result of 
a  future physics – and so rule out the strong sense of mystery being discussed here. 
The second is that those writers’ sense of mystery does not tend to initiate moral and 
spiritual transformation in the way that the strong sense does; certainly the attitudes of 
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my concern is therefore that the adoption of a scientistic stance will 
reduce, in part or in whole, a person’s capacity to cultivate receptivity 
to experiences of mystery. Such loss of receptivity can take a variety of 
forms – from a total lack of native receptivity in one case to the atrophy 
of  a  dormant sense in another – and these are discussed in the next 
section. A  scientistic person may find that the ‘picture’ of the world 
they implicitly operate with finds no room for mystery, so no sense of 
it obtains, nor can the possibility of that sense be entertained. unless 
the world is pictured in such a way that mystery is possible – perhaps, 
following Heidegger, in terms of an ineffable ‘source’ or ‘ground’ of being 
– then experiences of mystery will find little purchase. The concern 
shared by Cooper and Cottingham is that the forms of scientistic stance 
which are both prevalent and powerful within modern societies tend 
to militate against such openness, thereby contributing to a  loss of 
receptivity to mystery.
V. SCIeNTISm AND loSS oF reCePTIVITY To mYSTerY
There are many ways in which a  scientistic stance can contribute to 
a  loss of receptivity to mystery. Cooper and Cottingham identify 
several of these, which I will present in ascending order, ranging from 
a  person’s own receptivity to mystery to their attitudes towards those 
figures and traditions that report and incorporate a sense of mystery. It is 
worth noting that one might suggest that some persons simply lack any 
receptivity to mystery, so that a scientistic stance does not, in fact, affect 
them; that may be so, but it strikes me as more plausible to suppose that 
receptivity to mystery, just like appreciation of beauty or goodness, is 
the ‘default option’ for most persons. understanding those persons who 
seem to have a native lack of receptivity to mystery – let alone beauty or 
goodness – is a task for another time.
There are four ascending ways in which the adoption of a scientistic 
stance may occlude a  person’s native receptivity to mystery. First, 
a  scientistic stance may prevent a  person from ‘responding’ to 
experiences of mystery in the necessary way, perhaps because of their 
writers like Sagan and Dawkins towards religion do not evince the sort of edification 
that Cooper and Cottingham, amongst others, describe. For a useful discussion of such 
rhetoric, see John Haught, Is Nature Enough? Meaning and Truth in the Age of Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2006).
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conviction that reality lacks anything like a  ‘transcendent’ dimension. 
That person will, argues Cottingham, be able to respond to the world 
only as a  ‘sequence of  brute facts’, thereby remaining closed to the 
possibility of an ‘intimation’ of anything beyond it.35 Certain ‘modes 
of receptivity’ are thereby ruled out, including bishop berkeley’s seeing 
the ‘mighty frame of the world’ as the ‘mind of [an] eternal spirit’, or 
martin Heidegger’s, in regarding nature as something which ‘assails 
and enthrals us’ – rather than being mere particles in motion – to cite 
two examples offered by Cooper.36 Since an experience of mystery is, in 
part, constituted by one’s appropriately responding to it, any inability 
to respond thereby compromises the possibility of the experience; and 
so, as Cooper puts it, a  scientistic stance occludes our experience of 
mystery because it ‘obstructs the having of it’.37
Second, a scientistic stance diminishes our receptivity to mystery by 
undermining our capacity to openly engage with those persons who are, 
in fact, possessed of that receptivity. many persons who are receptive 
to mystery nonetheless fail to have strong experiences of it, yet are able to 
take seriously the testimonies of those who do – such as Teresa of Avila or 
the Sufis; so one may be receptive to others’ experiences of mystery, even 
in the absence of any experiences of one’s own. but for a person operating 
with a scientistic stance, such testimonies are automatically reinterpreted 
and downgraded in scientistic terms; hence the neurobiologist Vilayanur 
ramachandran’s insistence that ‘our mental life – all our feeling and 
emotions’ are, at base, ‘simply the activity of these little specks of jelly in 
our heads, in our brains’.38 A person persuaded of this is thereby debarred 
from experiencing testimonies to experiences of mystery as just that – 
experiences of mystery – for they will inevitably be ‘translated’ into other 
terms (those of neurobiology, in ramachandran’s case).
This loss of receptivity to testimonials of experiences of mystery 
generates specific problems for Cooper and Cottingham because it 
35 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, p. 48.
36 George berkeley, Philosophical Writings, T. Jessop (ed.) (london: Nelson, 1952), 
p. 148. martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. macquarrie and e. robinson (oxford: 
blackwell, 1980), p. 100. For a  sophisticated account of Heidegger’s views on the role 
played by science in the occlusion of certain ways of experiencing nature, see David 
e. Cooper, ‘Heidegger on Nature’, Environmental Values, 14 (2002), 339-351.
37 Cooper, The Measure of Things, p. 341.
38 V. S. ramachandran, A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness (New York: Pi Press, 
2005), p. 3.
65reCePTIVITY To mYSTerY
challenges their specific proposals for cultivating a  sense of mystery, 
which constitute the third and fourth ways that a scientistic stance can 
undermine receptivity.
Third, a scientistic stance prevents a person from being able to regard 
certain people – either poets, philosophers, or religious figures – as what 
Cooper calls ‘heroes’. These heroes act as guides or exemplars, for, as 
Cooper rightly remarks, a person may have no idea about what a sense 
of mystery is or how certain practices may provide intimations of it. Such 
persons in that state of uncertainty will, quite naturally, try to seek out 
a hero, a person – real or fictional, historical or contemporary – whose 
life seems to ‘answer to [and] be given shape by’ their sense of mystery.39 
Yet, of course, one will find it difficult, if not impossible, to invest ‘resolute 
confidence’ in such people if one is, to quote Wittgenstein, persuaded that 
‘poets [and] musicians’ only exist to ‘entertain’ rather than to ‘teach’, and 
so many potential ‘heroes’ – including those deeply attuned to a sense of 
mystery – are thereby lost to them.40
Fourth, a scientistic stance prevents a person from participating in the 
‘communities of praxis’ which Cottingham describes. It is only through 
such practical and social immersion that one can begin the ‘process of 
growth and transformation’ which is the ‘catalyst’ for what I have called 
receptivity to mystery.41 Yet that becomes impossible if one subscribes to 
the view that the praxis of that community is unwarranted nonsense, for 
then participation in those practices, and the surrounding community, 
becomes absurd. An illustrative example is owen Flanagan’s recent call 
for a  ‘naturalisation’ of buddhism, purging it of ‘mind-numbing and 
wishful hocus pocus’, like karma and rebirth.42 If one takes this proposal 
seriously, then the practices and traditions of buddhism are thus 
impugned, for their component metaphysical claims will appear, as they 
do to Flanagan, as ‘silly superstitions’, such that it becomes difficult, if not 
impossible, to sincerely participate in them. For it is not at all clear either 
that concepts like karma are inessential features of buddhist philosophy 
or that the integrity of its ethical teachings would survive their removal.43
39 Cooper, ‘living with mystery’, p. 12.
40 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch. (oxford: blackwell, 1980), p. 42.
41 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, pp. 143 and 152.
42 owen Flanagan, The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalised (Cambridge, mass.: 
mIT Press, 2011), p. 3 passim.
43 See the interesting discussion of Flanagan’s naturalised buddhism at the ‘buddhist 
ethics Naturalised’ panel at the Contemporary Perspectives on Buddhist Ethics conference, 
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once these points are appreciated, a  fifth emerges, namely that 
a scientistic person gradually loses their sense not only of mystery, but 
of what Paul Feyerabend called the ‘abundance’ of the world. This refers 
to the fact of their being a rich diversity of ways of conceiving of and 
comporting oneself within it, through which one can come to recognise 
the ‘richness of being’. Such abundance can be lost through an insistence 
upon the exclusive truth of some one set of conceptions of reality, 
such as those of the sciences, when it is better, argued Feyerabend, to 
cultivate a sense of ‘spontaneous tolerance’ towards alternative traditions 
and a ‘quieter, more wondering attitude’ towards the world.44 A person 
possessed of this attitude will revoke the scientistic stance and instead 
strive to learn ‘from the sciences [and] also from the humanities[,] 
religion and from ... ancient traditions’, consonant with Cooper’s and 
Cottingham’s call to re-engage with those spiritual traditions within 
which a  sense of mystery plays a  central role.45 Indeed, Feyerabend 
himself argued that reality in itself – what he called ‘being’ – is ‘ineffable’ 
and unknowable, although ‘abundance’ in his sense does not necessarily 
entail that; one can be open to the idea of there being alternative 
accounts of reality without also subscribing to a  doctrine of mystery, 
even if Feyerabend, for the record, did.46
These five ways in which a  scientistic stance can contribute to the 
loss of receptivity to mystery are related in a  variety of ways, most 
often in a  mutually reinforcing manner. my treatment of these five 
ways is not exhaustive, but nor need it be for present purposes. Cooper 
and Cottingham may, of course, disagree on the details of these ways 
of reducing receptivity to mystery; however, both agree that a  person 
operating with a scientistic stance may be rendered unreceptive to both 
their own experiences of mystery and those of others, including the 
religious and philosophical figures and traditions within which those 
experiences play a central role.
Columbia university, 6-7 october 2011. A podcast of that panel is available online at 
<http://www.cbs.columbia.edu/buddhist_ethics/panel-one.htm>. I  am grateful to Jan 
Westerhoff for a helpful discussion of Flanagan’s views.
44 Paul Feyerabend, Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness 
of Being, bert Terpstra (ed.) (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 2001), p. xi.
45 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method. 3rd ed. (london: Verso, 1993), p. 249.
46 See further Ian James Kidd, ‘Feyerabend on the Ineffability of reality’, Models of 
God and Alternative Ultimate Realities, Asa Kasher and Jeanne Diller (eds.) (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2012).
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VI. CoNCluSIoNS
The aim of this paper was to explore the theme of loss of receptivity to 
mystery common to Cooper and Cottingham. I argued that both identify 
the prevalence of a scientistic stance as a prime cause of the loss of such 
receptivity in modern societies, since it distorts a  person’s capacity to 
properly respond to their own experiences of mystery and to engage 
openly in the practices and with the traditions which the cultivation 
of a  sense of mystery requires. It is worth closing by considering two 
possibilities – one each from Cooper and Cottingham – for how one 
might challenge that scientistic stance.
The first is that one could restore appreciation of the traditions within 
which doctrines of mystery have enjoyed a central role. Cooper writes of 
a ‘modesty or humility’ which attends the recognition that ‘philosophers 
from earlier times, and different cultures’ would regard many of our 
beliefs – such as scientific realism – as ‘incredible’.47 Although such 
appreciation does not in itself necessitate a commitment to a doctrine 
of mystery, it would surely encourage an abandonment of scientistic 
insistence on the immaturity or absurdity of those traditions. Such 
recognition involves humility because it requires us to concede that our 
own achievements – the scientific Weltbild for example – should not 
blind us to the possibility, indeed the fact, of alternative conceptions of 
reality and forms of life.
The second strategy for restoring receptivity to mystery is offered 
by Cottingham’s proposals for a  reorientation of the philosophy of 
religion in a ‘humane’ direction.48 Although what brian leiter calls the 
‘naturalistic turn’ has produced much valuable work, there are good 
reasons to suppose that its capacity to provide the necessary resources 
to explore and understand the domain of the religious is reaching its 
limits. Cottingham proposes that a  ‘humane turn’ is needed, whereby 
philosophers can ‘address ... questions about human self-understanding’ 
using ‘methods and resources’ quite distinct from those typical of 
the naturalistic turn. Indeed, Cottingham judges that ‘the adoption 
47 David e. Cooper and Peter S. Fosl, Philosophy: The Classic Readings. (oxford: 
Wiley-blackwell, 2010), p. xxiv.
48 John Cottingham, ‘What is Humane Philosophy and Why is it At risk?’, in Anthony 
o’Hear (ed.), Conceptions of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2009), 
pp. 233-255. on the idea of humane philosophy as a response to scientism, see Ian James 
Kidd, ‘Humane Philosophy and the Question of Progress’, Ratio, XXV, no. 3 (2012), 277-290.
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of a  humane approach’ is an ‘essential prerequisite’ of a  revitalised 
philosophy of religion: one liberated from scientistic preconceptions 
which distort and occlude much about religious life.49
These two proposals may perhaps raise as many problems as they might 
resolve. Certainly Cooper and Cottingham set themselves ambitious 
tasks, especially since the success of their proposals is crucially premised 
upon a  reassessment of the naturalistic orthodoxy of contemporary 
mainstream philosophy. but when one considers that such self-reflexive 
criticism is a central feature of the philosophical enterprise, and that the 
sentiments expressed by Cooper and Cottingham are aligned with ancient 
and venerable spiritual traditions, a call to take seriously these claims of 
loss of receptivity to mystery appears neither unwarranted nor absurd.50
49 Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension, p. ix.
50 I  offer my thanks to David e. Cooper and John Cottingham for inspiring my 
thoughts on this topic and for their kind participation in the ‘mystery, Humility, and 
religious Practice’ workshop, and to Guy bennett-Hunter, Arlette Frederik, Thomas 
Greaves, Jan Westerhoff, and Jonathon Winthrop for their very helpful comments on 
this paper.
